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form of punishment lies in the direction of what is known as the "indeterminate sentence." But this raises a large and somewhat complicated question of penology, and one that applies not only to murder but to all crime.

The question for the moment is the abolition of that illogical, unjust and impracticable distinction which, while considering each manslaughter case on its own merits, insists on continuing to pass the same sentence for every kind of murder—a sentence which in every other case cannot be carried out.

CARL HEATH.

LONDON.

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### THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION.\*

In Russia we see an extraordinary phenomenon. The justification of government is, of course, that it serves the people. It may come from the people or it may be imposed on them; its justification is the same, that it guides, directs, helps, serves. In Russia, on the other hand, we see a government that has become a great machine, working largely on its own account; its relations to the people are mainly to draw sustenance from them; it does not so much help them as make an enormous load on their backs; it exists principally to maintain itself, to extend itself, to enrich itself; it is like a foreign substance in the body politic, not the head and brain and nerves of that body, as a government normally is.

Undoubtedly the Russian government was not altogether this at the start, else it could hardly have got started. In three ways it served: it was a means of defense against the foreigner (principally Tartar or Turk); it broke the power of an ancient landed aristocracy; and it established the rude beginnings of civil order (protecting in some measure life and property). Probably by means like these it secured its remarkable hold on the reverence, even the affection and confidence, of the peasants, who, aside from the nobility (old and new) and government officials, practically *were* the people.

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\* An Address given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago.

And undoubtedly, in a certain elementary fashion, the government still serves the people: it is still a means of national defense and a source of civil order, whatever woful mistakes it makes both in war and peace.

But, with these qualifications, what I have said holds true. I have been deeply impressed to this effect as I have read a book<sup>1</sup> by one who believes monarchy still the only form possible for Russia, and parliamentary government not yet feasible.

Russia, in the political sense, is not very old, contrary to the general impression that it is an ancient and hoary empire; all there was of it five or six centuries ago was the Dukedom of Moscow. But about 1462 Duke John III began conquering and annexing the dukedoms and petty states that lay near him, and a work of conquest was thus begun which has gone on more or less continuously ever since. The result is that Russia now means one sixth of the habitable globe, a territory greater than that of the United States, and twice the size of all the empires, realms, and principalities of Europe put together.<sup>2</sup>

This succession of conquests is peculiar. It is not the work of the Russian people proper, but of an able, ambitious and unscrupulous line of monarchs, aided, of course, by an official military class. The Russian people are not naturally warlike, nor are they politically ambitious; for instance, they offered little resistance to the Norman vikings when they came down upon them, and they did make much resistance to the Mongol invaders in the thirteenth century. There has always been a party in Russia opposed to the conquests which the government has made—the so-called “Old Russian” party. In the days of Peter the Great this party was led by a son of Peter himself, who strenuously opposed his father’s policy, and was beheaded in consequence. The party was for restoring the

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<sup>1</sup> Wolf von Schierbrand, “Russia: Her Strength and Her Weakness,” 1904. To this and Milyoukov’s “Russia and Its Crisis” I am principally indebted, so far as statements of fact are concerned, in preparing this address.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. E. J. Dillon, *Fortnightly Review*, November, 1906, p. 770.

conquered countries to their former owners, reëstablishing in Moscow the old national comfort and quiet, avoiding interference with European countries and affairs, avoiding war, and lightening the burden of taxes. Down even to the time of Alexander I, at the beginning of the last century, this current of opinion continued. It was only at the court of the Czar and its environment that Russia was warlike and desirous of glory; outside, and among the mass of the people, there was a longing to keep aloof from Europe and to be free of costly military entanglements. Alexander I himself made this confession at the close of his life: "Of glory and honor I have had enough; but when I reflect how little has been done for the welfare of the nation, the thought weighs on my heart like a lump of ten pood."<sup>3</sup> It was not until Napoleon's invasion and the burning of Moscow that a change came over the peace-loving nature of the average Russian and he became warlike, though since that time a semi-religious sentiment against the Turk has been manipulated by the ruling military class so as to give support and even inspiration to two wars against Turkey.

So little has Russia, real Russia, had to do with this gigantic work of conquest that even now, it is said, the best soldiers in the army are of Polish extraction, the brain of it either Teutonic or Polish, the best portion of the cavalry non-Russian—Caucasian, Cossack, and Polish Uhlans—and the artillery and engineer corps the creations of non-Russians. The army has thus largely the air of a manufactured thing, not of a natural product and outgrowth of the spirit of the people. The present imperial house is itself as much German as Russian, if not more so. Indeed, so little is the government really Russian that for a century and a half the language of the nation has been tabooed at court; and the nobility, when among themselves, prefer to speak German or French, Russian being looked upon as a barbarous tongue, only "fit to be spoken to servants."

It is not to be denied that the conquests I have referred to

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<sup>3</sup> A pood=forty pounds.

have had their good side. By them a measure of order and security has been created in regions where formerly robber hordes despoiled the traveler, but now the merchant, the mechanic, the colonist, the official go about in full security of person and property. This is the same service as was done to Russia proper in the beginning. But when we ask what the conquests have cost, and who have paid for them, and who have derived the principal benefits of them, and what is the general effect of them, the answer is staggering. It would be idle to attempt to reckon the number of lives and the amount of money that have been sacrificed; figures, when they become so large, cannot really be grasped by the mind and lose their meaning. The practical point is that the Russian people, though they did not will the conquests or actively consent to them, but simply submitted and obeyed, in trustful, oriental fashion, have had to foot the bills; that they have had the burden and the loss, and the monarchy and the military and official class the chief benefits of the enterprise—the high salaries, the allotments of land, with the honor and glory thrown in; and that the general effect has been to make the separation of the government from the people greater, the autocracy more autocratic, the people more subject, to hinder enterprise and ambition, to check improvement and reform, to make the people poor and miserable and to keep them so. The author I have already referred to, sums it up when he says, "Three things only have been attained: a brilliant court, a large army, and the total subjection of every class of the people."

It is impossible to understand the circumstances that have led to the present revolutionary movement, or the motives that inspire it, unless we see and realize the working of this extraordinary government somewhat in detail. Let us consider it now, not in its conquests, but in its ordinary attitude to the people at home. I refer, of course, to the usual state of things before the convocation of the Duma last year.

In the first place, the government, though it destroyed in the beginning the old aristocracy, created a nobility of its own, giving lands, titles and honors, and special powers, in reward for military service, to a fresh set of men; and the peasant

had thus a change of masters rather than real freedom. Indeed, nothing was done to determine his rights against the new lords of the soil: even Byzantine law and Ottoman law protected the peasant, but the Russian government did not, and in time the peasants became actual bondmen, serfs.

If there is anything pathetic in history, it is the story of the Russian peasant for the last few hundred years. The pity of it is so great that the pity almost turns to scorn. The fair-speaking and doubtless well-intentioned Mr. Stolypin has admitted that "men who are compelled to live on one herring and three potatoes a day cannot be expected to understand the benefits of autocracy or the obligations of citizenship."<sup>4</sup> But though they have not understood the benefits of autocracy, they have seemed to believe in it, and to meet the obligations of citizenship all the same. In the days before their emancipation, when the nobility were their absolute masters and owners, they might be whipped even to death, and yet not murmur. Now (at least till very recently), they pay without a murmur their heavy and increasing taxes (for taxes increased between 1893 and 1892 twenty-nine per cent., and between 1893 and 1902, forty-nine per cent.), and their chief sign of sense at last is that they are anxious, being already mostly insolvent, not to save anything that can be sold for taxes.<sup>5</sup> The only evidence I find of any improvement in their condition is that there has been an increase in Russia generally in recent years in the consumption of sugar, though it is still only half as great *per capita* as it is in Germany and France, and not one fifth as great as in the United States. The consumption of alcohol in Russia is lower than in any other civilized country and decreasing. The peasant has meat four times a year. A Russian conservative speaks of chronic underfeeding and periodical famines among the whole peasant population in certain regions. The peasant, as he ordinarily has been, could only say, "Russia is great, and the Czar is far away." Perhaps there is something flabby and tame in his nature—as

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<sup>4</sup> Quoted in *Chicago Record-Herald*, Dec. 21, 1906.

<sup>5</sup> Milyoukov, "Russia," etc., pp. 442, 443.

we have seen, he is not naturally warlike; but I suspect more is due to his training, to the ideals which church and State alike have held up to him—and to the iron necessity to which he has simply had to submit. If you kill off men of spirit, of course you will have left chiefly men without spirit; and flogging or killing peasants has been counted no crime to the nobility. And now the government does not encourage manhood in the peasant; how can it when its whole interest lies in having obedient and submissive subjects? Some years ago, but since “emancipation,” a government official made an interesting report. A Russian, I may say, has naturally a free intelligence, and, if he has a chance, is apt to see and speak the truth. The report was detailed and technical—I can only give its conclusion: “The general complaints about the lack of order and cleanliness in our villages, the poverty of the peasant, his savagery, the poor quality of the village authorities. . . all this has the same root: it is the habit of external compulsion, to which the peasant has been inured for centuries past, and which has deprived him of every trace of initiative and individual enterprise.”<sup>6</sup> In other words, the government has ruled the peasant for its good, not for his own. His very poverty is more or less due to the government; after paying his taxes he has not enough bread. Contrary to his natural instincts, he goes into the army willingly—even with joy. Why? because for the first time in his life he can eat his fill. It is said that nowhere else does the soldier fare better than the average common man. Even when the peasant buys liquor, he has to pay nearly two thirds more than he would if its sale were not a government monopoly. The annual revenues from this same source sometimes reach \$250,000,000, most of the enormous sum being derived from the 100,000,000 peasants. And there is this further curious fact, that while the Finance Minister devotes one per cent. of the total net returns to the temperance movement, his subordinates in the provinces do what they can to hinder this movement, place obstacles of every kind in the way of the temper-

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<sup>6</sup> Schierbrand, *op cit.*, p. 158.

ance societies, the net result being that the government gets increasing sales and actually promotes drunkenness.<sup>7</sup>

Before turning from the peasants, let me speak of one specific way in which the government has diminished enterprise and ambition among them. It is by the system of communal rather than individual taxation. It is easier, simpler (from an administrative point of view), to deal with a community than with a miscellaneous lot of individuals; and by a system of communal rather than private ownership of land, and joint rather than individual responsibility for taxes, the government lightened its burdens. It is a question whether the Russian commune or "mir," is not, to a considerable extent, a government creation.<sup>8</sup> But this is the way the system works. A lump sum having to be raised, if there are those who are not able to pay their share, then those who make a better use of their land and earn more are obliged to pay more. The result is to make the relatively successful peasants suffer for the faults and shortcomings of their less successful neighbors. I need not say that, as men ordinarily are, this discourages enterprise and prevents progress. The tendency is to a low uniform level of labor and attainment. It is significant that in certain colonies on the borders of Russia (some of Russian and some of German origin), where the government has not pushed its communal system of taxation, and has left the peasants owning their individual pieces of land, there has been relative prosperity and progress. The Mennonites were an example of this—those interesting people who a few years ago came over into Canada because, against the pledges of Catherine II, who had encouraged them to come to Russia, they were being forced into military service.<sup>9</sup>

I turn now to speak of the merchant or middle class, and of the relation of the government to them. As a rule, Russian merchants and manufacturers are the descendants, one or more generations removed, of peasants; for nobles, in Russia, as

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p. 77.

<sup>8</sup> Schierbrand, p. 116; Milyoukov, p. 343.

<sup>9</sup> Schierbrand, pp. 136, 137.



elsewhere, do not ordinarily engage in trade or any productive work. But trade or manufacturing enterprise requires capital, and capital means saving, and as the peasant class had ordinarily nothing to save (as already explained), the merchants and manufacturers who came from their ranks were few and far between. More than this, before the rise of the Russian State proper, there were flourishing trading towns in Russia—towns that were as free as Florence and Genoa and Bremen, and some of which belonged to the Hanseatic League, and the new absolutist rulers virtually destroyed them. Freedom and wealth meant power, and the autocracy instinctively opposed these towns, and reduced them to impotence, just as it did the landed aristocrats. As I have said, a new nobility was soon made—you can make a noble with a word or a bit of parchment—but a middle class with capital is not so easily manufactured. Russia has, indeed, never got over its initial blight in this respect, and until within forty years, the very small middle class it has had have been chiefly foreigners. The capital for trade and manufacture and almost all the beginnings of town and city life, have come from extra-Russian elements, chiefly Germanic in the North and West, and Turkish and Tartar in the East. The towns are mostly near the borders. It is idle to say that the Russian has no aptitude for trade, and a flourishing and powerful middle class is not to be expected in that country; the truth is simply that the government, by the policy it pursued, rendered the rise of such a class next to impossible.

And because the middle class of merchants and manufacturers is insignificant, the so-called working-class in the cities is insignificant, too. They do not exceed two millions out of the one hundred and thirty millions of which the Russian empire is composed. They are hardly as yet a separate and distinct class, for they are more or less made up of peasants who come in from the country for the winter months, and go back to the country in the summer. They are only slightly organized, and the attitude of the government is shown to them in that a strike constitutes a crime. When anything of this nature does occur, the authorities intervene, generally

taking the stronger side—not always that of the manufacturers—and as the intervention is generally violent, and often untimely for one or the other side, the result is general dissatisfaction. The initial protest against the manufacturer generally ends with a protest against the government, and the manufacturer often secretly joins. Strikes thus tend to become political demonstrations.

A word as to what the government does in the way of educating the people: It spends annually 40 kopeks or more a head for this purpose—20 to 30 cents. The teachers are mostly priests. The late Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod said, "Education and schooling are more harmful than beneficial for the Russian peasantry." At least as little harm is done as possible, for any attempt to go beyond the three R's always meets with obstacles from the authorities. Much religious instruction is given (I have not spoken of religion and the church, for it is mostly a tool in the hands of the government for keeping the people quiet and submissive), and a large part of the instruction is devoted to, or rather against, the "Sectarians," so-called, who broke with the orthodox State Church because of its formalism and emptiness. Particularly in the last few years (practically nothing whatever was done before "Emancipation" in 1861), since local control of teaching has almost ceased, and while the country districts pay the expenses, the government controls the teachers and the text-books, the school-teacher is looked upon principally as an agent of his government, is inferior as a rule, and the correctness of his political principles is the main object of consideration. These schools, second or third rate as they are, are only some thirty thousand in number, supplemented by eighteen thousand parish schools, whose strong point is singing religious hymns and reading medieval Slavic, with the result that not more than one peasant girl out of every seven has even a slight knowledge of reading, and in many villages not even a single woman or girl can read or write.

It is impossible to go through a list of the performances of this sham government. There is little that is sound or normal or life-giving about it. Its concern is chiefly for itself, and

to keep itself a-going. It establishes courts, and then interferes with their independence. It establishes universities, but will not allow freedom of teaching. It has not allowed the growth of a capitalist class, and there is no capital in the country to build railroads and great enterprises with; it has to build them itself, and does so either by forced taxation or by hiring capital from better managed nations. None of these enterprises pays for itself, and the interest charges that have to be sent out of the country every year are colossal. The great object of the government is money-making; and it does not make it honestly, for whatever it conducts it turns into a monopoly. It reaches out after telegraphs and mines and forests and tobacco and beet sugar, and threatens to institute a bastard form of state socialism, not to serve the people, but to keep its great *corpus*, the huge, unwieldy, all-devouring machine that it is, alive. Separated from the people, it is out of touch with them and out of sympathy. It becomes haughty, brutal. Not long ago a Russian admiral, when some seamen complained that their meat was covered with worms, said, "If the meat isn't fresh, the worms are."<sup>10</sup>

Can we wonder that a government of this kind is at last being called to account? If we were speaking of any other country but Russia the wonder would be that it had not been before. And the trouble is now that it is probably being called to account only by a few. The fatality about despotism is that, long continued, it emasculates; it enfeebles, eats out and kills out the very elements that would put an end to it. Oriental despotisms like Babylon and Nineveh fell down all together—people and crown in one mass: their very sites are almost obliterated. In Russia the protesting revolutionary element is probably an insignificant fraction of its one hundred and thirty millions of people. There is no wealthy and powerful middle class, as there was to give backbone to the French Revolution. There is no large and organized working class as there is in England and in Germany and in the United States. There is no intelligent, self-reliant farmer class, like

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<sup>10</sup> Admiral Ciukuin, quoted in *Il Secolo* (Milan), July 16, 1906.

those who at Concord bridge "fired the shot heard round the world." There is nothing but the autocracy with its officials and the army on top, and the vast mass of ignorant, superstitious, wretchedly poor, and perhaps flabby peasants at the bottom—nothing, that is, aside from a handful of men in various professions, a small class of merchants and manufacturers, mostly of foreign origin, a few professors and university students, and some nobles who, largely through residence abroad, have imbibed liberal ideas, and are ashamed to contrast progressive Europe with their mother country.

All the same, the revolution has started, and nothing could more signally prove the power of ideas than the fact that, with so little material backing, it has commenced. It is a curious and interesting fact that political liberalism before the revolution (if we call the revolution this definite beginning of last year) arose, what there was of it, among the landed nobility themselves, and was dictated, not by class considerations, but by philanthropic feelings and advanced political theories.<sup>11</sup> Even the first socialists and anarchists, men like Herzen and Bakounin, belonged among the gentry class. It is curious and interesting, I say, because there is indicated thus an element of disinterestedness in the Russian nature, a capacity for a purely intellectual point of view, that strikes the practical German or Anglo-Saxon somewhat oddly; for not only does Marxian socialism base everything on class interest, but there is a corresponding theory held by many who are not Marxians that social changes in general are produced by those particular classes directly interested in the result. But it is the same now with the revolutionary leaders in Russia as it was half a century or more ago. Stepnyak, one of the best known of them in recent years, said that no one looked seriously to the peasantry for support, that the movement was entirely an urban one, looking partly to the working people, but chiefly to the educated classes in general. These classes, he held, manage the press, sit in the Zemstvos (provincial assemblies) and municipal councils, and hold the university professorships. We

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<sup>11</sup> Milyoukov, pp. 225-6.

should give up, he urged, the habit borrowed from Western Europe, of confusing liberalism with narrow *bourgeois* class interest. Ours, he declares, is not a class opposition, but an intellectual opposition. How clearly the truth of this comes out when we think of those ardent young school teachers who flocked into the country districts to teach the peasants soon after "Emancipation," until they were replaced by the government by subservient priests, and again, when we think of the socialists, who took their propaganda to the peasants, only to be delivered over by them to the police!<sup>12</sup>

And yet, noble and generous as it is, there are fatal limitations about a purely intellectual enthusiasm. If the war were one of ideas only, such disinterested ardor might be all-prevailing in time. But the war is against power, against a great organized mass of physical force, a force which sends you to the gallows or to Siberia if you do not agree with it. The problem is to undo this fearful, irresponsible power, to have only power that is for the people's good, to put it within constitutional limits, and the only way to make sure that this will be done is for the people themselves to do it. This is the constitutional democratic theory of government, whether a nominal king or emperor, or a president, is the executive head of the State. It is to change the fundamental law of Russia that the revolution is organizing. It is a government that will be responsible to the people that is the essence of the revolutionary demand. But to accomplish this, there must be power to meet power. To establish the right of free political institutions in a university lecture, or among a pack of students, is one thing—to develop the idea and the theory, to show how reasonable it is, and how necessary to meet the present crisis it is; but it is another thing to face the solid stone wall of an autocracy, a bureaucracy and an army, and to lay it low. For that, I say, there must be power.

"Man needs must fight  
To make true peace his own;  
He needs must combat might with might  
Or might would rule alone."

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<sup>12</sup> Milyoukov, p. 360; cf. Schierbrand, p. 230.

But where is there such power in Russia to-day? Do a handful of educated men, a few lawyers and profesors and students, make such a power? Do a few liberal-minded aristocrats make such a power? Do a few scattered bomb-throwers and assassins make such a power? How ridiculous! The power must be that of the mass of the nation. The smaller the revolutionary forces are, the more violent they are, the more ineffective. When the Russian people want the revolution, they will have it without bomb-throwing and assassination, by the simple resistlessness of their might. The sort of violence we have now, and which in the popular mind is identified with the revolution, simply throws the revolution back, and shows the infantile character of some of the revolutionary forces. It is the system that needs to be changed, and how are you going to do that by picking off a few officials, or even the most prominent of them, including the Czar himself? I say not the slightest thing in favor of the Czar and his officials. I hold they have done far worse things, and committed far blacker crimes than any of these men are doing who now seek to punish them; but if it is a question of a government responsible to the people instead of absolutism, if that is the meaning of the revolution, as it was with the French Revolution, of the English Revolutions, and of our own, then these assassinations have little more to do with it, save to prejudice and hurt it, than if they were explosions in the empty air. The real revolutionary forces are deeper than those of which we hear so much. They are largely slumbering, and yet they are there, and may awake to giant strength.

Let me mention one or two of those signs, and indicate what the forces are. In the first place, there is the hatred beginning to be felt by the nation generally for its corps of officials; an authoritative writer puts it stronger. In speaking of the bureaucracy, and of the officials, as changing from place to place, and never staying long enough in a place to assimilate themselves with the population and its thoughts and wants, he refers to an all-pervading hatred for these officials as something already existing.<sup>13</sup> Secondly, there is a gradually

<sup>13</sup> Schierbrand, p. 275.

rising discontent in the army. In 1902, Kouropatkin wrote: "The attempts of political agitators to spread propaganda in the army, formerly comparatively rare, have, in recent times, become more prevalent, and are carried on so boldly that it is necessary to give serious attention to them." The Cossacks alone are now considered entirely reliable; sometimes soldiers have refused to fire; both in the army and navy this past year there have been instances of this disaffection; soldiers and sailors have even fired on their commanders and the regular troops. If this spirit continues to spread, the very prop of the government will be gone, and the autocracy collapse, like a building whose foundations have been taken out from under it. The army may yet be with the people, rather than against them. Thirdly, a change seems to be coming over the peasants themselves. The "intellectuals," whether liberals or socialists, have been discouraged with the peasants. They have seemed a dead, stolid, submissive mass, impervious to ideas, without dignity or self-respect. But the heaven is working even among them. The peasants do not always hand their friends over to the police now; sometimes they conceal them from the police; and when requested to give up seditious leaflets that have been distributed among them, they often answer with plain refusal. It is said that to watch them more closely, thirty-five thousand special village policemen were introduced by Plehve. Moreover, the peasants are acquiring new airs, a new demeanor: the landlords call it insolence and effrontery; others see in it simple self-consciousness and self-assertion. A government council, considering the coming elections and how to limit the power of the peasants in the next Duma, confesses that the hopes that the peasant deputies would be obedient lambs have been cruelly belied. Occasionally the new spirit goes beyond legal limits, and leads to violence against landlord property, sometimes in resentment, more often to get the wherewithal on which to live. Whatever the excesses, it is a palpable fact that the inner being of the peasantry is undergoing a change; its old apathy and submission are being broken up, and a fresh meaning is given to Emerson's saying that "Love or crime leads all souls to the good."

Another force for change is being raised up in the workingmen of the cities. Gradually, as we have seen, and without meaning to, they are being introduced to a political rôle. The first strike in Russia (one in the cotton factories of St. Petersburg, some ten years ago) had purely industrial causes; the men wanted a twelve-hour day, a slight increase of wages and so on; socialists or "intellectuals" of any kind had nothing to do with it. The socialists were rather taken by surprise. And yet strikes (of which there have been many since, despite their illegality, and 120 out of 160 successful) usually lead to political demonstrations, as I have explained; and the workingmen tend to become an organized force, which may be counted on to become a force against the autocracy.

Moreover, though a middle class has been virtually non-existent in Russia down to recent years, such an element in the population is taking form now. Not all enterprise is in government hands. Manufactures and trade are increasing, despite discouraging import duties and other obstacles. Merchants and industrial leaders can be counted on to help on the struggle for political freedom, and though this class is small, and their wealth inconsiderable, they are bound to increase.

These are the varied forces that are to give blood and substance to the ideas of the "intellectuals." It may take time for them to gain due development; the revolution may not be accomplished for fifty years, or more than fifty years; but if the tendencies are now at work the question is simply one of time. Without this development of power, the ideas of the professional and educated classes are idle dreams; there may, of course, be murders and assassinations, but it is precisely because there is not a great orderly stream of might in the nation on the side of the revolutionary ideas that the agitation takes this feverish, hysterical and really diseased form. The thing for real friends of Russian freedom is, by agitation, unselfish labor, by submission to personal loss, by surrender of life even, to educate and coöperate with all the incipient popular forces I have just described; to promote enlightenment and discontent and the revolutionary spirit among peasants, workingmen, business men and the army itself.



Thousands have done and are doing this. Gratefully and reverently I would pay them my tribute of honor and admiration. All the silent forces of European civilization are aiding them. All American ideas are aiding them. Even famine in Russia aids them, even the folly of the Japanese war aids them, even the haughtiness and the crimes of the autocracy aid them, even the weakness and ineptitude of the present Czar aids them, even the brutal Cossack soldiers aid them; the stars fight against this great Sisera, who will yet be laid low.

We must look beyond the present situation for comfort and hope, look beyond the failure of the first Duma, which did not fail (since it brought the issue squarely up of responsible as opposed to irresponsible government, and the need of change in the fundamental law), look beyond the farce of the coming elections, where, by all sorts of tricks and devices, the people are to be prevented from expressing their real will; look beyond Mr. Stolypin's specious reforms, which bind nobody and deceive but few; beyond all this, or rather, shall I not say, deeper than all this, and see the currents already at work that will bring on the ultimate victory. Some are pessimistic about Russia, pessimistic particularly about the Russian peasant; what they say is a long wail for his utter, hopeless, immemorial poverty. But the fact seems to be that he has not been immemorially poor, or immemorially a slave. It is the present Russian government, dating back not more than a few centuries, that has largely helped make him the poor, abject, submissive creature that he is (or was), and when this government and its foolish, iniquitous policies and laws go, he will rise. It will go, and the peasant will help make it go.<sup>14</sup>

"For He that worketh high and wise,  
Nor pauses in his plan,  
Will take the sun out of the skies,  
Ere freedom out of man."

CHICAGO.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

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<sup>14</sup> Since writing the above, the elections to the second Duma have taken place and the new Duma has assembled with more representatives from the peasants than before. While political habits have yet to be acquired and political capacity shown, the revolutionary spirit—the indispensable preliminary to change—has had an amazing development.